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Pushing the Limits of Copyright Law
and Upping the Ante in the Digital World:
The Strange Case of A&MRecords,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
BY SHAWN D. CHAPMAN*
INTRODUCTION
"Napster may win or lose in court, but copyright law will never be the
same ."
espite its relative youth, the technology of the Internet has
already had enormous social, political, and economic impacts.
Though such a statement already seems clich6d, there is a fair
amount of truth to it. The near-instantaneous delivery of e-mail has
radically changed the way we communicate in both personal and business
contexts. The "complex interconnection 2 of the World Wide Web has
"profoundly altered the conditions we use to establish the intelligibility of
an issue or judgment 3 by providing us with immediate access to myriad
sources of information-a final step towards a sort of "permanent media"4
that surpasses even the promises of500-channel cable systems with twenty-
four hour news networks and innumerable manifestations of"educational"
programming. Advertisers rarely fall to include a Web address, or"UL.5
"J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky. For Callie Owen, il miglior
fabbro.
I Joseph Nocera & Tim Carvell, 50 Lessons, FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 2000, at 136,
137.
2 JODIDEAN, ALIENS INAMERICA: CONSPIRACY CULTURES FROM OUTERSPACE
TO CYBERSPACE 9 (1998).
3 Id. at 9-10.
4 1d. at 10.
5 URL stands forUniform Resource Locator. It is the technical term for a World
Wide Web address (e.g., http://www.fbi.gov). THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICIONARYOFTHEENGLISHLANGUAGE(3ded. 1996), http.//www.dictionary.com
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The Internet has even changed the way we shop, as more and more people
turn to "e-tailers" to make their purchases.6 The Internet has in some
manner touched almost every facet of contemporary life.
But until recently, the Internet has had limited impact upon the law.
Legislators are obviously aware of the changes being wrought by the
Internet, and they have slowly enacted legislation that at least contemplates
or recognizes those changes.7 The courts, however, have only recently been
confronted with the impact of the Internet and related technology upon
more traditional areas of the law. One of the most prominent, and most
natural, areas of the law to experience the effects of the Internet is
copyright law. Computers and the Internet make the circumvention of
copyright, through the copying and distribution of formerly tangible media,
a relatively simple endeavor. The increased availability, appeal, and ease
of use of computers and digital technologies, particularly where audio and
visual media are concerned, have created a sufficiently large user base that
copyright holders are growing increasingly concerned about the viability
of their copyrights, especially given the ease of copyright evasion.' In an
effort to protect their interests, copyright holders, particularly the music
recording industry, have turned their attention to the providers of the
technologies that allow (or at least appear to allow) avoidance of copyright
protection. The recent focus of the litigation regarding these issues has been
upon technologies that deal with MP3s, a digital music medium.9
This Note traces the relevant aspects of American copyright law and
analyzes its application in the recent MP3 cases. Part I of this "Note
(last visited Mar. 25, 2001).
6 See, e.g., JessicaDavis, E-tailers Bracingfor OnlineHolidayRush (indicating
that 2000 online holiday sales in North America are expected to exceed $10
billion), at http://www.idg.net/crd_idgsearch_258150.html?sc=57020139_16136
(Sept. 29,2000).
7 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.);
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, TitleV, 110 Stat. 56,
133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (selected provisions
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 held unconstitutional by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997)). Despite these congressional attempts at regulation, the Internet has largely
gone unpoliced.
I For example, the software for Napster, the technology dealt with at length in
this Note, is available forfiree on the Internet, and the Napster service is currently
free. Napster already has millions of users. See infra Part ll.A.
9E.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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explicates Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,"0 the
preeminent contemporary case on copyright infringement, and briefly
discusses the early cases concerning the copyright issues posed by the
creation, distribution, and use of MP3 files." Part II offers an analysis of
both the district court and Ninth Circuit opinions in the Napster case. 2 In
particular, this part focuses on the courts' failure to apply the basic
philosophy behind the Sony decision and, more specifically, the failure to
apply Sony's "staple of commerce" doctrine to the Napster system. Part IMl
addresses the overwhelming social response to the Napster controversy,
examining the legitimacy (or lack thereof) that a ruling in the Napster case
might have in the eyes of the public. 3
I. A DECIDEDLY BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
AND THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 14
Copyright has been an important facet of American law since the birth
of the nation. 5 The Constitution expressly provides Congress with the
power to regulate in this area: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' 6 Congress has exercised its power to protect
copyrights several times by enacting comprehensive legislation,' most
10 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
"See infra notes 14-113 and accompanying text.
'
2 See infra notes 114-251 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 252-315 and accompanying text.
14 For a more detailed discussion of the history of American copyright law, see
Stephanie Skasko Rosenberg, Note, Anticipating Technology: A Statute Bytes the
Dust in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
Inc., 45 VILL. L. REv. 483,485-91 (2000). For a succinct discussion of copyright
law in general, see UCLA ONLINE INSTITUTE FOR CYBERSPACE LAW AND POLICY,
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/
cbasics.htm (Feb. 10, 2001).
15 SeeU.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (dealing expressly with the power to regulate
copyrights). See also Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at430 (discussing the historical origins
of copyright law). The Sony Court indicated that developments in copyright law
have been due to technological innovations. Id. at 430-31. The Court pointed to the
Copyright Act of 1909, which was partly a result of the advent of player pianos
with perforated music roles, as an example. Id. at 430 n.1 1.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
'" Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 1790. ROCHELLE COOPER
DREYFuss &ROBERTAROSENTHALKWALL,INTELLECUuALPROPERTY 232 (1996).
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recently with the Copyright Act of 1976,"8 the Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992,19 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.20
A. The Not-So-Primordial Ooze, orHow Things Were Before the Internet:
The Sony Decision and the "Staple Article of Commerce" and "Fair
Use " Doctrines
Congress's copyright legislation has created a framework through
which some intellectual property can be protected. Through a combination
of the broad coverage of copyright law2" and the snail's pace of most
legislation, however, technology often outstrips the precise coverage of
copyright legislation, leaving to the courts the undesired role of arbiter
between copyright holders and alleged copyright infringers.' The most
11 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C.). The 1976 act represented "a major substantive revision of
its immediate predecessor, the 1909 Copyright Act." DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra
note 17, at 232.
1 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
20 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
21 The scope of copyright protection is quite broad, extending to the form of
almost all creative works and excluding only the ideas themselves:
(a) Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
1 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984). One especially relevant quote comes at the end of themajority opinion:
"It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology, just as
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important of these decisions to contemporary jurisprudence is Sony Corp.
ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc.'
In Sony, the Court delineated the limits of copyright law protections
against encroachments by newtechnologies. There, Universal City Studios,
Inc. (CUniversal") and Walt Disney Productions ("Disney") brought a
copyright infringement suit against Sony and several other retailers for
manufacturing and selling Betamax video tape recorders (VTRs). 4
Universal and Disney claimed that because the VTRs were capable of
recording television broadcasts, they could be used to record copyrighted
programming, which would infringe upon the copyrights held by Universal
and Disney.5 Universal and Disney further alleged that Sony and the
retailers were liable for the resulting copyright infringement because the
Betamax VTRs were marketed specifically as recording devices.2"
Ultimately, the Court rejected Universal and Disney's copyright infringe-
ment claims
7
In rejecting the infringement claims, the Court relied heavily on the
factual findings of the district court. The district court found that the
"primary use of the machine for most owners was 'time-shifting'---the
practice of recording a program to view once at a later time."' VTR owners
were also recording programs and keeping them for repeated viewing-in
effect, building libraries of tapes.29 Despite this, VTR owners had not
decreased the amount of television they watched. Sony also showed that
a significant amount of copyrighted programming could be recorded
without objection by the copyright owners.3"
The Court also recounted a significant amount of policy and copyright
history to further support its holding. The Court indicated that copyright
it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply
laws that have not yet been written." Id. at 456. See also infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
2 Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
24 Id. at 420-22.
25Id. at 420.
2 See id.27 Id. at 456.
28Id. at 423.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 423-24.
31 Id. at 424. The Court cited a survey indicating that 7.3% of VTR use was for
recording sports programming, and that "representatives of professional [sports]
testified that they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for
home use." Id. Religious and educational programming also could be copied
without objection. Id.
2000-2001]
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law arose from and further developed in response to technological
changes 32 and that "the protection given to copyrights is wholly
statutory."33 As such, the Court indicated that the judiciary is reluctant to
"expand the protection afforded by the copyright without explicit legisla-
tive guidance." '34 The Court warned that when "Congress has not plainly
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of
rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a
calculus of interests."35 The basic function of the copyright is to "promot[e]
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts," which is
done by encouraging and rewarding creative work 6 The copyright and
subsequent financial rewards are simply a means to an end. The basic
purpose of the copyright is the public good, not enrichment of the copyright
holder.37 As such, the copyright is not entirely exclusive; the holder does
not receive a complete "bundle" of rights from the copyright3 Moreover,
32Id. at 430. "Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment
-the printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection."
Id. 33 Id. at 431.
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 431-32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151,156 (1975)).37 Id. (quoting Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156).
38 Id. Copyright holders have six exclusive rights:
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies orphonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) inthe case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographicworks,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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"[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose."'39
Confronted with a significant technological change-the advent of
readily available machines that could record freely broadcast television
programs-the Court proceeded cautiously, with "this basic purpose" in
mind.4" Initially, the Court dealt with the issue of Sony's liability for the
VTR owners' infringing actions. The Court indicated that the Copyright
Act did not expressly provide for vicarious or contributory liability for
copyright infringement, though absence of such a provision would not
preclude liability.4' Because Sony simply provided the means of copyright
infringement and was not "in a position to control the use of copyrighted
works by others and had [not] authorized the use without permission from
the copyright owner," 2 a finding of vicarious liability would have had to
"rest on the fact that [Sony] ha[d] sold equipment with constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material." '43
Because there was "no precedent in the law of copyright for the
imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory," the Court turned to
patent law as the closest conceptual analogue45 The Court adopted the
"staple article of commerce" theory as the appropriate means of evaluating
claims of vicarious or contributory copyright infringement.4 The staple
article of commerce doctrine indicates "the sale of copying equipment, like
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses." ' The Court also phrased the test as whether a product is "capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses"' 8 and as whether "a signifi-
cant number of [uses of the product] would be noninfiinging." 9
Unfortunately, neither formulation of this test is a model of clarity.
What exactly do "substantial" and "significant" mean? Where should the
39 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 432 (quoting Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156).
40Id. at 431-32.
41 Id. at 434-35.
42 Id. at 437-38.
43 Id. at 439.
44Id.
45 Id. at 439-40.
4sId. at 441-42.
47 Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
49Id.
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line be drawn? The Court alleviated a need for precise quantification,
indicating that "in order to resolve this case we need not give precise
content to the question of how much use is commercially significant."'
Again, this stipulation is not wholly satisfying given the Court's reliance
on statistics concerning the 'millions of owners of VTRs."' Other
language in the opinion points towards a very low threshold that must be
met in order to satisfy the staple of commerce test3 2 For example, in
response to Universal and Disney's proposition that an injunction is
appropriate where the infringing use outweighs the noninfringing use, thus
presumably overcoming the value preserved by the staple article of
commerce test, the Court quoted the district court's opinion: "Whatever the
future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an
injunction that seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an extremely harsh
remedy, as well as one unprecedented in copyright law."'53
The Court held that Sony satisfied the staple article of commerce test.
The Court interpreted the district court's language as a finding that the
religious, educational, and sports programming, which was authorized to
be copied for home use and which constitutes a minority ofprogramming,54
was sufficient to meet the "significant noninfringing uses" standard."
Because there was a range of programming authorized to be copied and
millions of people made copies of these progams, VTRs were found to be
capable ofnoninfringing uses.' Furthermore, "in an action for contributory
infringement against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder
may not prevail unless the relief he seeks affects only his programs, or
unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the
outcome."57 In other words, a finding of contributory liability is not
mandated just because the technology in question allows for infringing use.
The Court refused to find Sony liable because the millions of authorized
copies served as evidence that VTRs were "capable of some noninfriging
use."
58
50Id.
51 Id. at 446.
2 See id. at 444.
5Id. (emphasis added).
I See id. at 443-44; supra note 31.
55 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 445 (noting Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood as an
example of programming that is authorized for home recording and use).56 Id. at446.
57Id.
58Id. at 444-46.
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The Court also indicated that the "fair use" doctrine protected the
recording of the programming that was not authorized for recording, such
as that produced by Universal and Disney, so long as the recording was not
for a "commercial or profit-making purpose." 9 A commercial or profit-
making recording would be "presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege." The district court's findings indicated the
opposite-that "time-shifting for private home use must be characterized
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity."' Further, even if a use is
noncommercial, it can still be considered "unfair" ifa preponderance of the
evidence shows the activity to be "harmful" or if its widespread use "would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." 2 Unfair
uses constitute infringing uses. In applying the 'fair use" doctrine to
Betamax's VTRs, the Court pointed to several parts of the district court's
opinion, indicating:
Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal .... [B]ene-
fits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and advertisers, as the
Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts....
Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjustments in
marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a likelihood of harm.
Television production by plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has
ever been, and... there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the
Betamax will change the studios' financial picture.63
The Court indicated that these factors, when "weighed in the 'equitable
rule of reason' balance," lead to the conclusion that even the recording of
programming to which the copyright holder objected constituted a "fair
use," and thus was protected.'
The Court's use of the "staple of commerce" and "fair use" doctrines
to protect the manufacture and sale of VTRs made Sony a landmark case.
But more important than the application of these doctrines, especially in
light of the direction of copyright law today, is the Court's emphasis on the
ideas and policies behind copyright law. As the Court pointed out, the
91 Id. at 447-49.
60Id. at 451.61Id. at 449.
62Id. at 451.
I Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
6Id.
6s Id. at 454-55.
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rights guaranteed by copyright law can only be found in what Congress has
written, and the rights asserted by Universal and Disney are not found in
the Copyright Act:
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day
have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or
have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such
copying possible.66
Any expansion of the rights guaranteed by copyright law, even in light of
a radical new technology, would have to come directly from Congress.67
B. Sony's Children: Copyright Enters the DigitalAge
With the rapid expanse of the Internet and the use of digital technolo-
gies such as CDs68 and DVDs,6 9 lawmakers and the courts have once again
come face-to-face with challenges to copyright law. Congress responded by
enacting the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA")70 and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 7" the first significant
revisions to copyright law since 1976. The ABRA was promulgated "to
implement a royalty payment system and a serial copy management system
66Id. at 456.
67 See id.
6' CD is an acronym for "compact disc," a digital audio format. JOHN HEDTKE
& SANDYBRADLEY, MP3 FORMUSICIANS (2000), http://www.topfloor.com/mp3m/
smplch/glossary.htm.
69 "'DVD' as a product name does not stand for anything-... DVD is a
branded, trademarked name (owned by the DVD Consortium). As an acronym,
DVD has various interpretations, including Digital Versatile Disc and Digital Video
Disc, but these initials have come to represent more than just an acronym." DVD
and Microsoft Operating Systems, at http://www.microsofecon/hwdev/devdes/
dvdwp.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2001). The Introduction of this web page includes
a further technical discussion of the DVD technology.
70 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(codified as amended at §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
71 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). For a discussion
of the DMCA's effects on copyright law, specifically an analysis of the "safe
harbor," see Justin Williamson, Note, OnlineServiceProviderCopyrightLiability:
Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act the Answer?, 88 KY. L.L 987 (1999).
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for digital audio recording, to prohibit certain copyright infringement
actions, and for other purposes," while the DMCA sought to bring
copyright law into the digital age by providing, among other things, for
civil and criminal penalties for the circumvention of copyright protection
systems' and granting a safe harbor against liability for Internet service
providers.74 Technology has already outpaced these revisions, however,
presenting a situation that does not appear to have been anticipated by
either the AHIRA orthe DMCA. s The convergence ofcommunications and
digital technology, specifically the Internet and MP3s, has created a
challenge to copyright law of even larger proportions than that in Sony.76
I Audio Home Recording Act, 106 Stat at 4237.
7 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (Supp. IV 1999).
74Id. § 512.
75 See Alex Allemann, Note, Manifestation ofan AHRA Mafinction: The Un-
certain Status of MP3 Under Recording Industry Association of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 79 TEx. L. REv. 189 (2000) (arguing that the
AHRA failed to anticipate MP3 technology).
76 An MP3 file is a small computer file (on average from three to six mega-
bytes) containing compressed digital music often taken from a compact disc. See
HEDTKE & BRADLEY, supra note 68, at http://www.topfloor.com/mp3m/smplh/
glossary.htm. See also infra note 130.
Analogous to the conflict between MP3s and copyright law is the new DVD
technology, which has recently become the subject of a copyright case that in many
respects parallels that of the MP3 cases. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Reimerdes involved theinternet
distribution ofthe computer code for a piece of software known as DeCSS. DeCSS
is a means of circumventing the DVD encryption system known as CSS. Id. at 303.
The District Court for the Southern District ofNew York held that DeCSS violates
the anti-circumvention measures of the DMCA. Id. at 346. The legal issues
involved in the DeCSS case are complex (Judge Kaplan's opinion is over fifty
pages), and as such they are beyond the scope of this Note.
What is most interesting, however, is the response to the suit Facing threats of
an injunction against further distribution of the DeCSS code, the defendants
engaged in "what they termed 'electronic civil disobediene'-increasing their
efforts to link their web site to a large number of others that continue to make
DeCS Savailable."Id at303. Some of the defendants settled the case, including the
initial defendant, ShawnReimerdes. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111
F. Supp. 2d 346,346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The remaining defendants, specifically the
hacker magazine 2600 and its editor-in-chief Eric Corley a/k/a "Emmanuel
Goldstein," turned the DeCSS issue into a crusade against the Motion Picture
Association of America ("MPAA"). SeeA Summer of Tials, 2600: THE HACKER
QUARTERLY, Fall 2000, at 4. 2600 has also started a "Stop the MPAA" campaign
on its website, complete with t-shirts, bumper stickers and buttons. 2600: The
2000-2001]
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Two cases have been decided in federal courts already-Recording
Industry Ass 'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.' and
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.7s These cases only deal tangen-
tially with the issue of MP3 files as an infringement of copyright, and thus
they have failed to resolve the issue of liability. They do, however, offer
some insight into the issue that is currently brewing in the Napster case.
1. Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.
The federal courts first encountered MP3 files in the fall of 1998 with
Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
Inc.79 There, the court was asked to apply a portion of the copyright law,
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,80 to prevent the further production
and distribution of the Diamond Rio, a small portable MP3 player
manufactured by Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. ("Diamond"). The
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), which "represents
the roughly half-dozen major record companies (and the artists on their
labels) that control approximately ninety percent of the distribution of
recorded music in the United States,"' based its case on the AHRA's
Hacker Quarterly, at http:/Iwww.2600.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2001).
Copyleft.net, an organization that supports the "open-source" software movement,
has produced a t-shirt with the DeCSS code printed on it. See Copyleft, at
http://www.copyleft.net (last visited Mar. 25, 2001). This t-shirt has led to
Copyleft's inclusion in similar California CSS litigation as a defendant. See
Amendment to Complaint (July 17,2000), DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. John Doe
(Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara) (No. CV 786804), available at http://www.copyleft.
net/images/p3.gif (page 1); http://www.copyleftnet/images/p4.gif (page 2) (last
visited Mar. 25, 2001). These responses are similar to the social (or at least online)
response to the MP3 cases discussed in this Note. See infra notes 270-90 and
accompanying text. For more information, from both sides, see MPAA Copyright
Press Releases, at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/content.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2001); OpenDVD.org, at http://www.opendvd.org (last visited Mar. 25,2001).
77Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
78 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
"Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1072.
8 ) Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994). See
also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
81 DiamondMultimedia, 180 F.3d at 1074.
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requirements that any "digital audio recording device" distributed in the
United States incorporate an anti-copying system known as the Serial
Copyright Management System ("SCMS")82 and that a royalty be paid to
the recording industry for each such device sold.' The RIAA asserted that
the Rio was a digital recording device, and thus RIAA clients were owed
royalties on each Rio sold in the United States Additionally, the RIAA
requested that the court enjoin Diamond from further production of the Rio
without the SCMS. '
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the Rio fell outside the "ambit
of the Act."86 The Rio was not a "digital audio recording device," and thus
it was not subject to the requirements of the AHRA. 7 The court based its
holding on a detailed analysis of the language and legislative history of the
AHRA, concluding that computers, computer hard drives, and their
contents had been intentionally excluded from the definitions of "digital
music recordings" and "digital audio recording devices.""8 As such,
computers and hard drives fell outside the SCMS requirement. Addition-
ally, because the Rio's source of digital files was a computer hard drive, the
Rio was not a digital music recorder. 9
While ultimately Diamond Multimedia is an important victory for
champions of the MP3 format, the specific holding of the case-that
portable MP3 players do not violate the Audio Home Recording Act-does
little to advance Napster's cause. Judge O'Scannlain's dicta, however,
anticipates several of the arguments used in the Napster litigation, 9"
indicating that MP3s, or at least some of the practices concerning the use
and distribution of MP3s, might be excluded from the reach of copyright
law.9"' For example, in a footnote, Judge O'Scannlain indicates that whether
piracy actually causes serious harm to the recording industry is a matter of
serious dispute for two reasons.' First, "a willingness to download illicit
files for free does not necessarily correlate to lost sales, for the simple
2 Id. at 1075 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (1994)).
83 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994)).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86Id. at 1075, 1081.
87 Id. at 1081.88 Id. at 1077-78.
89 Id. at 1076.
90 See infra Part II.
11 Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1073-79.92 Id. at 1074 n.1.
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reason that persons willing to accept an item for free often will not
purchase the same item, even ifno longer freely available." 3 Additionally,
"the price of commercially available recordings already reflects the
existence of copying and the benefits and harms such copying causes; thus
... the current price of recordings offsets, at least in part, the losses
incurred by the industry from home taping and piracy."94 Essentially, the
recording industry's product is priced so as to incorporate the risk of
piracy. While neither of these arguments constitutes an affirmative defense
to a claim of copyright infringement, they do indicate the dubiousness of
the recording industry's claims of over $300 million in losses to piracy each
year.9' The court indicated that "the Internet also supports a burgeoning
traffic in legitimate audio computer files."
More important, however, is Judge O'Scannlain's discussion of"space-
shifting." Space-shifting involves the transfer of a sound recording from
one medium to another in order to increase ease of use.97 For example,
dubbing a CD onto a cassette tape would constitute space-shifting. The
court indicated that moving MP3 files from the user's hard drive to the Rio
was merely space-shifting." Presumably, converting a song from a CD into
an MP3 on a computer's hard drive using the Rio's software would also
constitute space-shifting. As such, space-shifting is analogous to the time-
shifting that was protected in Sony by the fair-use doctrine, and deserves
similar protection as an exception to copyright liability.' The court
indicated that the main purpose of the Audio Home Recording Act is the
"facilitation of personal use" and that "[s]uch copying is paradigmatic
noncommercialpersonal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the
Act.,100
2. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
encountered a far more complex and questionable set of facts in early 2000
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 1074.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 1079.
98 Id.
99 Id.
1'od. (emphasis added).
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with UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc."°1 MP3.com began offering
its "My.MP3.com" service in January 2000.12 The service allowed
subscribers to access MP3 files in one of two ways. Under the first
alternative, the "Beam-It Service," subscribers had to prove that they
owned a CD by placing it in the CD-ROM drive of a computer. 3 Under the
second, the "Instant Listening Service," a subscriber bought a CD online
from one of MP3.com's affiliates.' ° That subscriber could then use any
computer with an Internet connection to download an MP3 of a song
contained on the "owned" CD from MP3.com's collection of over "tens of
thousands of CDs."' 5 MP3.com claimed that its service was simply the
equivalent of storage for subscribers' CDs.'06
The court, however, indicated that "in actuality defendant is re-playing
for the subscribers converted versions of the recordings it copied, without
authorization, from plaintiff's copyrighted CDs. On its face, this makes out
a presumptive case of infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976.'n°
Relying on several factors-specifically that the service was commercial
in nature and added nothing to the copyrighted works,"'8 that the works in
question were at the "core of intended-copyright protection,""0 9 that the
entire albums were copied,"' and that the service had a significant effect
on plaintiffs' potential market"--the court denied MP3.com's affirmative
defense of "fair use."". It should be noted, however, that UMG reached a
settlement agreement with MP3.com on the same day that the district court
awarded damages to UMG, "grant[ing] MP3.com a non-exclusive, North
American license for the use of UMG-controlled recordings on the
My.MP3.com system, including the 'Beam-it m' and 'Instant Listeningm'
software services.".
"I' UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
112 Id. at 350.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108Id. at 351.
109 Id.
110 d. at 352.
I"'IId.
"
2 Id. at 351-52.
"3 Court Awards Judgment to Universal Music Group in Copyright Infringe-
ment Suit with MP3.com, PRESS RELEASES, ABOUT MP3.coM (Nov. 14,2000), at
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II. "THE FUTURE IS Now": 114 NAPsTER
In mid-1999, Shawn Fanning, an eighteen-year-old dropout from
Northeastern University, wrote the file-sharing software known popularly
asNapster."5 Less than six months later, Fanning's company, Napster, Inc.,
came under legal fire from the recording industry. The RIAA and several
record companies filed lawsuits against Napster, Inc. in December 1999 in
federal district court, "alleging contributory and vicarious federal copyright
infringement.""' 6 The district court has issued several written opinions in
the case,"' including a grant of a preliminary injunction against further
copyright infringement."' The injunction was appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which recently issued an opinion upholding
the district court's injunction but requiring a narrowing of the injunction's
coverage." 9 Because the court of appeals primarily covered the same
ground as the district court, this Note focuses primarily on the district
court's opinion. Where the Ninth Circuit offers a different rationale,
however, this Note addresses the opinion of the court of appeals explicit-
ly.
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's first opinion dealtwithNapster's motion for
summary judgment based on the "safe harbor" provision of the Digital
Millennium CopyrightAct, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)."20TheDMCA's safeharbor
grants immunity from vicarious liability to Internet service providers for the
actions of their customers."' Napster claimed that the 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)
safe harbor provision protected it from liability for copyright infringement
http://pr.mp3.com/pr/217.htnl.
14 Jerome Kuptz, The Peer-to-Peer NetworkExplosion, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at
234,234.
"' Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60, 63-64.
6A&MRecords, Inc. v.Napster, Inc., 54U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746,1746 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
" See id. (denying Napster's motion for summary judgment based on the "safe
harbor" provision of 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos.
C9905183MHP & C00007MHP, 2000 WL 1170106 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000)
(ruling on the admissibility of expert witnesses); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (issuing an injunction againstNapster's
operation of its file-sharing system), affd inpart and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001).
"'Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
"
9 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).2o0Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746-47.
121 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. IV 1999).
[VOL. 89
LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
by users of the Napster software and servers." Judge Patel, however,
denied the defense because 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) requires that the safe harbor
only apply where connections and routing occur through the service
provider's systems." Because the MP3 files implicated in the case were
transmitted not through Napster's servers but via the Internet, Napster
could not claim the safe harbor protection. 4 IfNapster had simply routed
the MP3 files through its own server, presumably it could have claimed the
safe harbor exception since it would then meet the requirements of 17
U.S.C. § 512(a). The court of appeals indicated that the DMCA's safe
harbor was not necessarily inapplicable to Napster, but a proper resolution
of the issue would require a depth of factual determination available only
at trial."
Because a restrictive reading of the exception like the interpretation
employed by the district court virtually assured that no Internet company
can claim the exception, other commentators have dealt it with at length.16
While this is an interesting issue, the Napster litigation has focused on
other, more important issues such as "fair use" and "staple of commerce,"
which are discussed in this Note. " Before turning to those issues, however,
some discussion of the background of the case, especially how the Napster
system functions, is necessary.
A. Background
Shawn Fanning's software became the basis for Napster, Inc., an
Internet start-up company in California.22 Napster provides its software,
called "MusicShare," free of charge over the Internet. 29 Napster provides
servers that gather information, such as file names and sizes, concerning the
"2 Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748-48. For an excellent discussion
supporting the application of the DMCA safe harbor as a defense for Napster, see
Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster:A Window onto the Future of Copyright Law
in the InternetAge, 18 J.MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 755, 775-82 (2000).
2 Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751-52.
l4 Id. at 1752.
' A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
" See, e.g., Berschadsky, supra note 122. It should be noted, however, that
Berschadsky's article, like the majority of the academic writing on the Napster
issue, was written and published before Judge Patel had issued any rulings or
opinions.
127 See infra Part H.B.
I Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
12 Id.
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"shared" MP3 files on a user's computer when that user logs on. 30 The
server then makes that information available to otherNapster users who are
online and searching for MP3 files using the Napster software. 31 Once a
user has found a file that she wishes to download, the Napster software
"facilitate[s] a connection between the two users."'3 The transfer of the
MP3 file itself, however, occurs via the Internet-a direct connection
between the computers of two users-rather than through Napster's
servers.133 While the primary function of the "Napster system... [is to]
allow[ ] users to search for, request, and download MP3 files," it does have
several other functions, including an MP3 player and chat program. 34
Apart from defending itself against the allegations of the recording
industry, Napster has shown some concern regarding the legality of some
of the transfers facilitated through its system. The company "has developed
a policy that makes compliance with all copyright laws one of the 'terms
of use' of its service, '13 and it warns users that their accounts may be
terminated for copyright infringement. 36 Despite this policy and warning,
"evidence shows that virtually all Napster users download or upload
copyrighted files and that the vast majority of the music available on
Napster is copyrighted.' 37 Currently Napster does not charge users for its
131 Id. MP3 files "reproduce nearly CD-quality sound in a compressed format."
Id. "The Motion Picture Experts Group first created MP3 in the early 1980s ....
MP3 technology allows for the fast and efficient conversion of compact disc
recordings into computer files that may be downloaded over the Internet." Id. n. 1
(citingRecording Indus. Ass'n ofAm. v. DiamondMultimedia Sys., Inc.. 180 F.3d
1072, 1073-1074 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also supra note 76.
31 Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. Judge Patel's May 12,2000 opinion
contains a detailed, step-by-step description of how the Napster software and
service functions. Id.
132 Id.
113 Id. It should be noted that "direct connection" is something of an over-
simplification here. The files do not literally pass directly from one user's computer
to another-they must firstpass through the extensive infrastructure of the Internet.
What is most important here, however, is that the files are not transmitted via
Napster's servers.
13 Id.
"I Id. at 1747-48.
136 Id. at 1748. It should be pointed out, however, that Napster "did not docu-
ment or notify users of the existence of this policy until February 7, 2000," a full
month after the initiation of litigation. Id.
'
3  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,902-03 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd inpart and rev 'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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software or its services because it is waiting to build a large user base.'
Some estimates indicated that Napster would have as many as "75 million
... users by the end of 2000."' 3 While the numbers are actually lower,
Napster does currently have "more than 50 million members."'"
B. The District Court's August (7) Opinion and the Ninth Circuit Appeal
On August 10, 2000, Judge Patel granted a motion for a preliminary
injunction against Napster's operations that involved the unauthorized
transfer of copyrighted music.' She ordered that Napster refrain "from
engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions
and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state law, without
express permission of the rights owner."'42 That decision was appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, which recently handed down a decision upholding most
of the district court's legal conclusions.'43
In her opinion for the district court, Judge Patel made extensive
findings of fact'" and law. 45 The findings of fact are comprehensive,
including descriptions of the MP3 technology,'" Napster's business
model,'47Napster's system and technology,'" the recording industry,49 and
Napster's effect on the recording industry.50 The court emphasized the fact
that "Napster users were engaging in unauthorized downloading and
"I Id. at 902. Napster has settled with some record companies, including
BMG's parent company Bertelsmann AG, and it plans to institute some form of
subscription-based service. Napster Says It Will Appeal Ruling, CNN.COM (Feb.
12, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/12/napster.decision.04.
139 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (emphasis added).
140 Napster Says It Will Appeal Ruling, supra note 138.
141 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
'
4 2 Id. at 927.
'
43 SeeA&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The
court of appeals, however, remanded the injunction, indicating that the district
court's initial injunction was too broad because it placed the entire burden of
enforcing the plaintiffs' copyrights on Napster. Id. at 1027.
144 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901-11.
145 Id. at 911-27.
146 Id. at 901.
147 Id. at 901-05.
148 Id. at 905-08.
149 Id. at 908-09.
50 1Id. at 909-11.
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uploading of copyrighted music,'.. that most of the files involved were
copyrighted,' and that Napster knew of this practice.' The court
indicated that these factors lead to the conclusion that A&M Records and
the other plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of direct copyright
infringement by Napster users (and thus, by implication, a case of
contributory or vicarious infringement on Napster's part)." Napster
attacked the claim of vicarious infiingement with two affirmative defenses:
fair use and substantial non-infringing use. 55
1. Napster's Fair Use Defense
"[An] individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the
copyright holder does not possess the exclusive right to such a use.""T As
such, a finding of fair use is very important because it allows an exception
to the copyright liability of the direct infringer (i.e., the Napster user in this
case). Fair use would constitute a defense forNapster because contributory
infringement and vicarious liability require the existence of direct copyright
infringement."57 Judge Patel first analyzed the general statutory description
of the fair use exception,'58 which includes the following factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.159
Because the "downloading and uploading [of] MP3 music files with
assistance of Napster are not private uses"'' and Napster users "reap
'I Id. at 903 (emphasis added).52 Id. at 902-03.
153 Id. at 903-04.
TS Id. at 911.
155 Id. at 912.
'$" Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 433 (1984)).
157 Id. at 911 (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 434). This logic is the basis of the
staple article of commerce defense. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
'
58Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
159 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
'60 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
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economic advantages from Napster use"16 by downloading songs they
would normally have to buy, Napster use was found to be commercial
under the first factor, which weighs against a finding of fair use. 62 Under
the second factor, the songs in question were found to "constitute entertain-
ment, which cuts against a finding of fair use."163 Because "it is undisputed
that downloading or uploading MP3 music files involves copying the
entirety of the copyrighted work,"'" the third factor also weighs against a
finding of fair use. 6" Finally, the fact that Napster "reduces CD sales
among college students"'" and "raises barriers to plaintiffs' entry into the
market for the digital downloading of music"6 7 evidences an adverse effect
on the market for copyrighted music, thus weighing against a finding of fair
use under the fourth factor.'"
Much of Judge Patel's analysis of Napster's defense of "fair use' is
correct, and the court of appeals agreed after reviewing the district court's
decision for abuse of discretion and clear error.'69 Judge Patel's rejection
ofa general fair use exception forNapster use simply makes sense. Napster
and its users are engaged in a commercial activity that involves copying of
protected material and ultimately has an adverse effect on the record
companies' market.7" All four of the factors in 17 U.S.C. § 107 are met.
The problem, however, arises from Judge Patel's analysis of Napster's
specific claims of fair use: "sampling, space-shifting, and the authorized
distribution of new artists' work."'' She first applied the § 107 factors in
an extensive, and quite persuasive, analysis of sampling." Ultimately,
because users can permanently keep the music they "sample" from
161 Id.
162Id. at 912-13.
163 Id. at 913 (citations omitted).
164 Id.
16S Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
169 Id.
11 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir.
2001).
170Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2dat912-13. It should be noted that the effect on the
market is a finding of fact specific to this case. Evidence exists, and has been
acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit, which indicates that the recording industry
may not suffer economi6 harm from MP3 piracy. See supra notes 92-96 and
accompanying text.
17' Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
17Iad at 913-15.
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Napster'" and because of the adverse economic effect of widespread
Napster use,"1 sampling does not constitute a fairuse in this context. This
reasoning is sound. Napster's comparison of its service to a free listening
station in a record store simply defies common sense, since Napster users
"obtain a permanent copy of the song.""7 5
Judge Patel's analysis of the other claimed fair uses-authorized
distribution and space-shifting-is not as convincing. This becomes
especially important when considered in light of the argument that if
specific practices are deemed "fair uses," then "the staple article of
commerce doctrine precludes liability for contributory or vicarious
infringement."' 76 Because of their importance in the analysis behind the
staple article of commerce doctrine, these specific fair uses--space-shifting
and authorized distribution-are discussed in the following section."
2. Napster's Staple Article of Commerce Defense
In denying Napster's fair use (and subsequent staple article of
commerce) claim regardingspace shifting and legitimate distribution, Judge
Patel misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. ofAmerica
v. University City Studios, Inc.179
Space-shifting "refer[s] to the process of converting a CD the consumer
already owns into MP3 format and using Napster to transfer the music to
a different computer-from home to office, for example."'" The Ninth
Circuit in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc., 8° expressly analogized the space shifting of MP3s to the
"time-shifting" protected in Sony-holding that "[s]uch copying is
paradigmatic noncommercial personal use."'' As such, the practice of
space-shifting should constitute a fair use.
Judge Patel attempted to dispel this argument by claiming that because
the Ninth Circuit was applying a provision of the Audio Home Recording
173.Id. at 914.
174 Id. at 914-15.
175 Id. at 914.
176 Id. at 916.
" See infra notes 178-251 and accompanying text.
171 Sony Corp. of Am. v. University City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
179 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
"'
0Recording Indus. Ass'n ofAm. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
I Id. at 1079.
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Act, an "inapplicable statute"" in this case, its analysis of space-shifting
was also inapplicable. 3 In an extensive footnote, the judge attempted to
support this dismissal ofNapster's argument, but the note consists of little
more than a reiteration that the AHRA is inapplicable."' The Ninth
Circuit's dicta is not "of limited relevance,"'" if only for the simple reason
that Judge O'Scannlain's opinion in Diamond Multimedia makes clear the
analogy between space-shifting and Sony's time-shifting--an analogy
whose application is not limited only to the AHRA. Judge Patel's "irrele-
182 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
83 Id. at 915 n.19.
'KIn its entirety, Footnote 19 reads:
Defendant's opposition brief opens with a perplexing argument. It cites
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
("AURA"), immunizes the non-commercial use of Napster to space-shift
music. The AHRA is irrelevant to the instant action. Neither the record
company nor music publisher plaintiffs have brought claims under the
AHRA; moreover, the Ninth Circuit did not hold in Diamond Multimedia
that the AHRA covers the downloading of MP3 files.
DiamondMultimedia involved asuitunder the AHRA by the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA") to enjoin the manufacture and
distribution of the Rio portable music player-a hand-held device that can
receive, store, and re-play MP3 files. See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d
at 1074. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rio player is not a digital audio
recording device subject to the AHRA's restrictions. See id. at 1081. Nor are
computers and their hard drives digital audio recording devices. See id. at
1078. The DiamondMultimedia court didopine that making copies with the
Rio to space-shift, or make portable, files already on a user's hard drive
constitutes "paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent
with the purposes of the Act [i.e. the facilitation of personal use]." Id. at
1079. However, this dicta is of limited relevance. Because plaintiffs have
not made AHRA claims, the purposes and legislative history of the AHRA
do not govern the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction against
Napster, Inc. Furthermore, as explained below, the court is not persuaded
that space-shifting constitutes a substantial, non-infringing use of the
Napster service. The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the fair use doctrine in
Diamond Multimedia.
This court denies defendant's request for judicial notice of the
legislative history of the AHRA, filings inDiamondMultimedia, and certain
other materials deemed irrelevant or inappropriate for judicial notice.
Id. (alteration in original).
185Id.
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vance" argument is something of a bad-faith effort at avoiding this
issue--making a tautological argument that the dicta is irrelevant because
it is irrelevant. The analogy is clear, and a failure to apply it in this case
amounts to a misreading of Diamond Multimedia. Properly applied,
Diamond Multimedia indicates that the space-shifting of MP3 files,
whether it be from a personal computer to a portable device or from one
personal computer to another over the Internet, is the sort of non-infringing
use contemplated by Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine (i.e.,
"merely... capable of substantial noninfringing uses"'").
Judge Patel also attempted to support this finding of no fair use with
facts from the Napster case itself"'7 The court found that "space-shifting
accounts for a de minimis portion of Napster use and is not a significant
aspect of defendant's business."'" The court reached this conclusion
through the application of"[c]ommon sense,""8 9 basing its reasoning on
several factors including Napster's failure to show that it "saw space-
shifting as an attraction for its user base,""® and evidence showing that
"almost half of college-student survey respondents previously owned less
than ten percent of the songs they have downloaded. '"' She pointed to an
expert opinion indicating that a significant portion of college-age Napster
users do not own the music that they download."9 These facts, however, do
not support the idea that space-shifting is not a fair use. Rather, they are
part of the staple article of commerce inquiry into whether or not the non-
infringing use is substantial. Judge Patel again misread the Sony opinion,
claiming that the finding of time-shifting as a fair use was due to the fact
the "time-shifting represented theprincpal, rather than an occasional use
of VCRs."' While it is true that the Sony Court, did accept that time-
shifting was the principal use of VCRs, its finding of fair use was based on
an analysis of the four factors in 17 U.S.C. § 107.1 What portion of the
186 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).87 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
119 Id. at 904.
189 Id. at 905.
190 Id.
191 Id.
191id. at 916 ("[A]pproximately forty-nine percent of... college-student survey
respondents previously owned less than ten percent of the songs they downloaded,
and about sixty-nine percent owned less than a quarter." (citation omitted)).
'93 Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
421 (1984)).
194 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 447-56.
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overall use that a given fair use constitutes is only relevant in determining
whether the staple article of commerce doctrine is applicable, not in
evaluating whether a given use is a fair use. Judge Patel commingled two
separate aspects of the staple article of commerce analysis; determination
of "fair use" comes first 9s and is based on the criteria laid out in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.1" That said, a clear reading of Diamond Multimedia and Sony
indicates that space-shifting is a non-commercial, fair, non-infringing use.
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding space-
shifting,97 though it applied a different, yet equally flawed, analysis. The
court of appeals pointed out that in Sony- and Diamond Multimedia, the
person who "shifted" the copyrighted material did not also distribute that
material.1 The court indicated that Napster use was different from
Diamond Multimedia and Sony because "once a user lists a copy of music
he already owns on the Napster system in order to access the music from
another location, the song becomes'available to millions of other individu-
als."".' Simply because other persons are able to access the files, the
space-shifting is no longer a fair use. While this is certainly a stronger
argument than that offered by the district court, it again fails to convince.
Just because files are available to other persons does not change the fact
that the files are space-shifted, which is paradigmatic fair use. Space-
shifting is a separate activity from distribution to other persons. Simply
because a technology allows a fair use and an unfair use to occur simulta-
neously does not make the fair use unfair200
951 d. at442.
196 Id. at 447-56.
197 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
19 Id.
199 Id.
200 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 442 ("Indeed, [a product] need merely be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses." (emphasis added)).
Perhaps an analogy to VCRs in the following hypothetical situation will make
this analysis clearer. Suppose X lives in a region where a copyrighted television
show is broadcast. Xcannot watch the show when broadcast, so he records it for
later viewing. Clearly, the time-shifting is a fair use, as per Sony. But what ifXthen
sells the same videotape to Y, who lives in a region where the television show that
Xhas recorded is not broadcast (though the company that produces the show plans
to market video copies of the program in Y's region)? Presumably this would not
be a fair use under the 17 U.S.C. § 107 analysis (i.e., (1)Xhas recorded the entire
program, (2) his use is commercial in nature, (3) the program is entertainment, and
(4) Xis causing a demonstrable financial impact on the copyright holder because
Ywill not have to buy the commercial copy of the program). The simple fact that
Xhas used his VCR in a patently unfair manner does not change the fa~t that his
shifting use is a protected, fair use.
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The court of appeals attempted to support its position by citing two
cases: UMGRecordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.2 °1 andReligious Technology
Center v. Lerma. 2 These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable. The
Ninth Circuit claimed that the MP3.com case2 3 includes a finding that
"space-shifting of MP3 files [is] not a fair use even when previous
ownership is demonstrated before a download is allowed."2 '6 This argument
fails to take into account the most basic factual difference between
MP3. com and Napster: MP3.com provided the files, whereas Napster users
provide their own files. The fundamental idea behind a fair use is that it is
personal. In the MP3.com case, the use was not personal because the
company provided files (and thus they were directly infringing copyrights),
and because they reaped a financial benefit for the distribution of the files.
In the context of "time-shifting," this would be analogous to a company
selling bootleg copies of a television program so that people could watch
the programs at a time other than when broadcast. This is clearly not a
personal or fair use. As such, the difference between the practices in the
MP3.com case and the use of Napster, while subtle, are significant. The
court indicated that Religious Technology Center supported its position
because it "suggest[ed] that storing copyrighted material on computer disk
for later review is not a fair use."'2 5 Again, the alleged use in Religious
Technology Center, much like in MP3.com, was not a personal use.
Without getting into the messy details of that case, 6 it should be noted that
the defendant in Religious Technology Center did not previously own the
materials that he was "space-shifting."2 7 And the court's use of Religious
Technology Center directly contradicts theNinth Circuit's previous holding
in Diamond Multimedia-that space-shifting of MP3 files is "paradig-
matic" fair use.2"'
20 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351-52
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).21 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569, 1575 (E.D. Va.
1996).203 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
204 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
205 Id.
206 Religious Technology Center dealt with a civil action for copyright
infringement brought by the Church of Scientology, a group known for its
"aggressive[ ] policing [of] any breaches in security or unauthorized disclosures."
Religious Tech. Cir., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.207 Id. at 1571-72, 1574.
208 Recording Indus. Ass'n ofAm. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
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If anything, the space-shifting analyses offered by the district court and
the Ninth Circuit show only that some of the uses of Napster are not fair.
Thus, fair use by the direct infringers (Napsters users) is not a complete
defense. As such, Napster must ultimately employ this fair use as merely
part of a defense based on the staple article of commerce doctrine. The
staple article of commerce analysis simply addresses whether the product
is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses." 9 As noted above,"' the
Sony Court was reluctant to apply a rigid standard regarding whether a non-
infringing use was "significant" or "substantial." The very statistics cited
by the district court in Napster show that a large percentage of Napster
users are engaging in some sort of space-shifting.2 " Again, the Court's
language in Sony indicates resorting to mere accounting is unnecessary:
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording
might be, an injunction which seeks to deprive the public of the very tool
or article of commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented in copyright law." '212
Clearly, under the staple article of commerce doctrine, the amount of space-
shifting encountered on Napster should be enough to prevent an injunction
and ultimately serve as an affirmative defense at trial.
The district court's final argument against applying the staple article of
commerce doctrine is perhaps the strongest. The court indicated that the
doctrine does not apply because "Napster exercises ongoing control over
its service," 3 whereas Sony's "participation did not extend past manufac-
turing and selling the VCRs."2 " This argument is somewhat misleading,
especially when considered in light of the Sony Court's doctrinal concerns
regarding the rationale behind copyright law.215 The Court indicated that
the basic function of copyright is to encourage the "broad public availabil-
ity of literature, music, and the other arts," 6 and that the monopoly granted
to the copyright holder is simply a subservient means to that end.2"7 When
209 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).2
'
0 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
21 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affid inpart andrev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).212 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
213 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
214 Id
211 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
2 16 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at431-32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).217 Id. at 432.
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technology has advanced so as to elude a clear answer under current
copyright law, courts should be very reluctant to expand copyright
protection by interpreting the law through the lens of this basic function. As
such, the Sony Court was reluctant to give broadcasters a right to suppress
the new technology of the VCR.21 The cases that Judge Patel cited in this
regard (i.e., that retaining control of a product eliminates the staple article
of commerce defense) were all based on specific uses of currently existing
technology-technology that the copyright law has had time to ingest and
adjust to accordingly." 9 Napster, on the other hand, is more like the VCR
when it was introduced in the late 1970s. It is a new technology, the
primary function of which is democratization of access to music-a
function that coincides perfectly with the basic aims of copyright law.
Thus, rather than suppressing Napster, the Napster court should have been
loath to expand the recording industry's copyright monopoly, especially in
the initial stages of litigation when a potentially damaging injunction lies
ready to envelop and potentially destroy this new technology. The basic
philosophy of American copyright urges the release and support-not
hindrance-of new technology."
Given the district court's difficulty with the staple article ofcommerce
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit, with its furthest departure from the district
court's opinion, attempted to clarify the discussion by differentiating
between contributory liability and vicarious liability and then proceeding
to discuss the doctrine's application to each theory of liability.22 The court
defined a contributory copyright infringer as "one who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another .... Put differently, liability exists if the
defendant engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the
infringement." The court indicated that "Napster's actual, specific
knowledge of direct infringement renders Sony's holding of limited
assistance to Napster. [The court is] compelled to make a clear distinction
between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in
relation to the operational capacity of the system." m Essentially, the Ninth
2 I See supra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
219 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 917. The cases Judge Patel cites, all from 1984
or later, concern various issues surrounding the use and control of VCRs and video
cassettes-technology that had already been encountered by the Sony Court. Id.
2 See supra notes 32-39, 66-67 and accompanying text.
22 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-24 (9th Cir.
2001).
2 Id. at 1019 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
=3 Id.
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Circuit concluded that because Napster had knowledge of users' direct
infringement on its system, it could not claim staple article of commerce
immunity from contributory liability.
This assertion is troubling in two respects. First, Napster's knowledge
is simply an element of the claim of contributory infringement to which the
staple article of commerce doctrine is an affirmative defense. 4 The court
of appeals asserted that Sony simply requires that a court "not impute the
requisite level of knowledge.., merely because [the] technology may be
used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights.""22 On this point, the court
"depart[ed] from the reasoning of the district court that Napster failed to
demonstrate that its system is capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses."  The court then took a curious turn in its reasoning,
noting that if knowledge can be proven otherwise, then contributory
liability ensues.'27 The staple article of commerce doctrine does more than
create a rebuttable presumption of a lack of knowledge; it is an affirmative
defense. A reading of the Sony opinion, especially the areas repeatedly
cited by the court of appeals in support of this proposition?"8 fails to show
any sign of this twist in the doctrine. In fact, the Sony Court pointed out that
to assert the defense one need only show that the technology in question is
"merely... capable of substantial noninfiinging uses." 9 The Ninth Circuit
offers the same analysis regarding the material contribution element of
contributory liability,"2 ° but again the fact that staple article of commerce
is an affirmative defense undermines the logic of such a position.
The Ninth Circuit's second reason for asserting that actual knowledge
trumps the staple article of commerce doctrine was that the court felt
"compelled to make a clear distinction between the architecture of the
Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to the operational
capacity of the system." ' 1 Essentially, the court contended that Napster's
"conduct in relation" to its system-its continued control of the system and
subsequent failure to "block access to the system by suppliers of the
I2 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
22 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 436).
16 Id. at 1021 (citing A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,
916, 917-18 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001).
227 Id.
' Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 436,442-43.
n
9 Id. at 442.
230 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
231 Id. at 1020.
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infringing material, and ... fail[ure] to remove the material" 2 --when
combined with knowledge of the direct infringement was enough to
overcome the staple article of commerce doctrine. 3 Aside from the
objections raised in the preceding paragraph to such an interpretation, this
appears to be just the sort of confusion between contributory and vicarious
liability that the court of appeals warned against just a few pages later. 4
Not only that, the confusion also appears to be crucial in the court's
argument against the application of the staple article of commerce defense.
The court indicated that, "[i]n the context of copyright law, vicarious
liability extends beyond an employer/employee relationship to cases in
which a defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities." 5
Essentially, vicarious liability is "a form of risk allocation" ' 6 wherein,
presumably, the entity with supervisory power over the infringing activity
can protect the copyright most efficiently (i.e., cheaper than the entity
without supervisory control). 7 Vicarious liability focuses on continuing
control of the technology, a concern clearly implicated in the court's
discussion of contributory negligence, 8 yet the court went to great length
232 Id. at 1022.
'
2 3 Id. at 1019-22.
2 Id. at 1022-23.
25 Id. at 1022 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
236 Id. (citing Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TiG, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
1314, 1325-26 (D.. Mass. 1994)).
7 Risk allocation to the party who can most cheaply deal with the problem is
a typical "law and economics" argument. It is interesting to note that the Ninth
Circuit has posited another law and economics argument that, in the particular
context of alleged MP3 piracy, counters this risk allocation argument-specifically,
Judge O'Scannlain's argument that recording companies price the risk of piracy ex
ante by incorporating it into the price of their commercial recordings. See supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
" While the focus of this section is on the staple article of commerce doctrine,
it is important to note that the applicability of contributory and vicarious liability
theories based on Napster's continued control of its service is by no means clear.
The court of appeals buried its analysis of the extent of Napster's continued control
in a footnote, repeating the district court's mistaken analysis:
Plaintiff[s] ... demonstrate that defendant had actual notice of direct
infringement because the RIAA informed it of more than 12,000 infringing
files. Although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering these
files, the songs are still available using the Napster service, as are the
copyrighted works which the record company plaintiffs identified in...
their complaint.
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to express the difference between the two theories of liability, "not[ing]
that Sony's 'staple article of commerce' analysis has no application to
Napster's potential liability for vicarious copyright infringement."" 9 The
court cited two authorities for this claim: the Sony case itself, 0 and an
article by Anne Hiaring for the Practising Law Institute's Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series2 41
The court correctly pointed out that specific claims of direct and vicarious
liability were not before the Sony Court and that the Court "recognized that
the 'lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and
vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.' 242 The court, however, pro-
ceeded to argue that as a result, the Sony Court used the terms contributory
and vicarious liability imprecisely and interchangeably. 3 DespitetheNinth
Circuit's characterization, an imprecise use of the terminology of these two
theories of indirect liability does not necessarily mean that the Sony Court
intended the staple article of commerce analysis to only apply to one
theory. Nothing in the Sony opinion supports such a reading. In fact, a look
at the philosophical underpinnings of the Sony Court's opinion-that the
arts, sciences, and new technology should be promoted, not hampered by
the limited monopoly provided by copyright law 2 ---indicates that the
opposite conclusion is proper. The staple article of commerce analysis is
an affirmative defense to both theories of indirect copyright liability. To
read Sony otherwise would allow the fundamental rationale behind
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 n.6 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). At
first glance, this is damning evidence for sure. But upon careful consideration of
the nature of the Napster service and of peer-to-peer file-sharing in general, it
becomes clear that this analysis suffers from a logical flaw. The presence of
infringing files afterNapster "purportedly" terminated the users offering those files
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that those users were not actually
terminated (i.e., that Napster was not exercising a degree of control necessary to
show that itwas actually respecting the recording industry's copyrights). It simply
means that other persons on the service could have made the songs available after
other users were terminated.
239 Id. at 1022.
240 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35
(1984).
24 Ann Hiaring, Copyright Infringement Issues on the Internet, 617 PLI/PAT
455, 528 (Sept. 2, 2000).242 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 435 n. 17).
243 Id. at 1022-23.
For a more in-depth look at this analysis of Sony's philosophical rationale,
see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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copyright to be swallowed by a distinction between two theories of liability
that essentially merge in. practice (as evidenced both by the Supreme
Court's interchangeable use of the two theories and the Ninth Circuit's
difficulty in drawing a distinct line between the two despite its express
desire to do so).
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's faith in its other claimed authority is
mistaken. The court claimed that Anne Hiaring's article "indicat[es] that
the 'staple article of commerce' doctrine 'provides a defense only to
contributory infringement, not to vicarious infringement' " Apparently
the court misread Hiaring's article, as the quoted language is not part of
Hiaring's original analysis. Rather, it is part of an attachment-an
exhibit-that consists of the Notice of Joint Motion and Joint Motion of
Plaintiffs for Preliminary Injunction filed by the Napster plaintiffs, A&M
Records, et al.' Essentially, the court cited the plaintiff's brief as authority
for its contention. Given that the Sony decision seems to indicate otherwise,
reliance on the Hiaring article as support for the idea that the staple article
of commerce doctrine does not constitute an affirmative defense to
vicarious liability is both unnecessary and misplaced.
Napster also claimed that the authorized distribution ofdigital content
is a sufficient fair use to invoke the staple article of commerce defense.247
Napster had begun a "New Artist Program," where "[n]ew or unsigned
artists [could] promote their works and distribute them via the Napster
service."" 8 For an artist to participate, permission must be granted to
Napster and its users to distribute the artist's songs."' While "at least on
paper" this program was part ofNapster's business plan as early as October
1999, the program was not implemented "until April 2000-well after
plaintiffs filed this action." As such, the district court found that the
program "accounts for a small portion of Napster use and did not become
central to defendant's business strategy until this action made it convenient
to give the program top billing."' Again, the court confused the existence
of a fair use with the "substantial" requirement of the staple article of
commerce doctrine. No one disputes that the authorized distribution of
245 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Hiaring, supra note 241, at 528).246 Hiaring, supra note 241, at 497-540.
247 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
248 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff-d in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).249 Id. at 907.
2150Id. at 904.
2 Id.
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MP3s is a legitimate use; such activity constitutes the crux of legitimate
use.
As such, the question for the court should simply have been whether
either use-space-shifting or authorized use--is substantial. As discussed
above, the Sony Court's language indicates a very lenient standard: merely
being capable of some legitimate use indicates that the staple article of
commerce defense is appropriate.
II. THE GHOST OF THE DIGITAL FUTURE:
NOT SO DEAD AFTER ALL
In the six months between Judge Patel's grant of injunctive relief and
the Ninth Circuit's decision upholding (in part) that grant, the world waited
anxiously. But the wait was anything but quiet. Each of the MP3
cases-DiamondMultimedia, MP3.com, and especially Napster-fostered
dramatic and varied responses.
Electronics manufacturers have taken the Diamond Multimedia
decision as an invitation to literally flood the market with MP3 players.
Several companies, including Sony-one of the plaintiffs in Napster and,
ironically, the defendant in Sony-have already put portable MP3 players
on the market 52 More thanfifty other manufacturers have now released
portable players. 3 One estimate indicates thatthe market for portable MP3
players should reach "$1.25 billion by the end of 2002."M The Napster
case, however, has cast some doubt upon these numbers and prospects for
the portable MP3 player market. For example, one analyst indicates that
2 Sony'sNW-E3 NetworkWalkmanDigitalMusicPlayerNW-MS7 Memory
Stick Walkman Digital Music Player, and NW-MS9 Network Walkman Digital
Music Player are all capable of playing MP3 files. Network Walkman NW-E3 w/
Carrying Case, athtp'.//www.sonystyle.com/sonystyle/4784/53347556/8091/8332.
default.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Memory Stick Walkman NW-MS7 w/
Carrying Case, at http://www/sontystyle.com/sonystyle/4784/5334/7556/5556/
8331.default.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); NW-MS9 Network Walkman
Digital Music Player, at http://www.sonystyle.com/sonystyle/4784/5334/7556/
5556/871 l.default.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2001). The popular online store
Amazon.com has an entire section dedicated to portable MP3 players.
Amazon.com: Electronics / Categories / Portable Audio & Video / MP3 Players,
at http'//www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/172630/ref=ebrbx-c_2_8/
002-6847305-1512863 (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
2 Richard Wilson, Playing MP3s, ELECTRONICS WEEKLY (OcL 11, 2000),
2000 WL 28779402.
2Id.
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online sales of MP3 players dropped by twenty-eight percent in the quarter
ending September 30, 200011
Despite its initial court loss, including a staggering verdict of well over
$100 million, 6 MP3.com is not succumbing to the pressure. With a final
determination of damages in November 2000,1 MP3.com announced that
it had secured a licensing agreement with Universal Music Group, which
represents several of the larger record companies, including A&M Records,
MCA Records, and Interscope Records.' MP3.com has also gone on the
offensive with a campaign to lobby Congress to change copyright law. 9
The campaign, called the "Million E-mail March," is aimed at encouraging
voters to contact their representatives in an effort to garner support for the
Music Owners' Listening Rights Act of 2000, which essentially would add
a section to Title 17 of the U.S.C. removing services such as those offered
by MP3.com from copyright liability.' 6 The Bill has received bipartisan
support, at least insofar as its sponsors are concerned,2 6' but its ultimate
chances of success remain to be seen. 62 MP3.com, however, has not relied
upon the Bill as its only means of protection, instead continuing to work to
reach licensing agreements with other record companies.2 63
The Napster case, however, has garnered the most publicity, receiving
more than its fair share of both damnation and praise. After Judge Patel
ruled against Napster on July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit almost immediately stayed the injunction.2" The aftermath of Judge
I Tony Kontzer, Do Fans Fear a Noose on Napster?, INFORMATION WEEK
(Oct. 23, 2000), 2000 WL 24586440.
I UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376, 1381
(S.D.N.Y 2000).
2 Court Awards Judgment to Universal Music Group in Copyright Infringe-
ment Suit with MP3.com, MP3.COMPRESS RELEASES (Nov. 14,2000), athttp:l/pr.
mp3.com/pr/217.html.
258 Id.
9 See Million EmailMarch, at http://www.mp3 .com/million (last visited Mar.
23,2001);see also Sam Costello, U.S. Lawmaker Wants toLegalizeMP3 (Sept. 29,
2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000fTBCH/computing/09/29/mp3.legalize.idg.
I H.R. 5275, 106th Cong. (2000).
261 Id.262 The Bill was not considered during the 2000 session, but its primary sponsor,
Rick Boucher, has vowed to reintroduce it in 2001. Shawn Zeller, Compromise,
Hell!, 32 NAT'L J. 3668, 3671 (2000).
263 See generally PressReleases, T3.COM, at http://pr.mp3.com/pr (last visited
Feb. 12,2001).
4 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 n.32 (N.D.
Cal. 2000), aft'd in part and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Patel's decision to enjoinNapsterbroughtto the controversy unprecedented
media coverage and penetration into American culture. After the injunction
was granted, Napster graced the cover of several major periodicals that
cover a range of interests-ABA Journal,2" Time,2' and Wired,267 just to
name a few. When the parties argued before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on October 3, 2000, little more than two months after the district
court's ruling, the story reached a roaring peak, becoming one of the hottest
stories of the year. Television news crews set up outside the courthouse in
the predawn hours, and hundreds of reporters created a "crush that
resembled past media circuses that centered on bloody gloves or whether
the president had sex with 'that woman.' 26B The extensive interest in the
story lead the Ninth Circuit to issue a "Media Notice" concerning the
upcoming release of its opinion on its website.269
Most interesting of all is that Napster use is soaring as a result of the
extensive media coverage. Before July 26, 2000, Napster already boasted
over twenty million users.270 The day after the district court ruling,
Napster's traffic shot up seventy-onepercent.27" ' And, thus with that single
district court decision, the first shot in "the great cultural war" was fired.2"
Literally millions of Napster users have shown where their loyalties
lie-not with the record companies, but with Napster-evidencing, much
to Judge Patel's distaste, "a new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs
ought to be free."2' With the ease of accessibility offered by Napster due
to the low barriers to "entry" into the new technology (all one needs is a
computer with Internet access, as the Napster service is currently free), the
digital revolution stands poised to become more than the mere rhetoric of
265 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000.
266 TIME, Oct. 2,2000.
267 WIRED, Oct. 2000.
268 See, e.g., Dan Fost, Frenzy overNapster, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3, 2000, at Dl.
261 This notice, of course, only lasted until the court's decision on February 12,
2001. After the decision was released, the court removed this notice and replaced
it with one stating that the decision" had been made public. References to Napster
have been completely removed from the website now that public attention in the
ongoing legal battle is no longer focused on the Ninth Circuit. See Ninth Circuit
Homepage, at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
270 Kuptz, supra note 114, at 134.
271 Id.
27 John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy ofldeas, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 238,
240.273 A&M Records, Inc. V. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 910 (N.D. Cal.
2001), ajffd inpart and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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pundits and techno-geeks. Certainly some commentators will (and already
have) label Napster as just another fad, another dot-com whose stock price
will peak immediately after its IPO, then plummet into bankruptcy. Others,
however, see Napster as the first sign of a new paradigm, of the actual "new
economy." 274
The most important part of the controversy, however, is the idea itself.
As French writer Victor Hugo observed over a century ago, "An invasion
of annies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."275 Even if
Napster ultimately loses its case, the impact will be temporary and
centralized to Napster itself. The idea behind Napster-peer-to-peer
networking-is out of the bag. As such, the effect on the Internet commu-
nity of an ultimate decision against Napster could be minimal. Users could
simply ignore it. If Napster disappears, several other peer-to-peer formats
stand ready to take its place: for example, Scour,276 Gnutella,2"7 and
Freenet.278 While services like Scour would be susceptible to a decision
against Napster given their similar use of central servers, 279 Gnutella and
Freenet are truly peer-to-peer because users interact directly with each
other without the use of servers to create an index of users and files.280
Because they avoid central servers, Gnutella and Freenet allow almost
complete anonymity.2 ' Additionally, these systems have "no centralized
control or administration,"282 so "there's no company to sue."283 Because
274See Barlow, supra note 272.
275 Victor Hugo, quoted in Barlow, supra note 272, at 238.
276 Welcome to Scour, at http//www.scour.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
277Welcome to Gnutella, athttp://gnutella.wego.com (last visitedMar. 3,2001).
278 The Freenet Project, http://freenetsourceforge.net (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
279 LikeNapster, Scour has also been sued by the RIAA. Recent Press Releases,
at http://www.scour.com/General/Company/Press/Releases (last visited Mar. 23,
2001). In addition to its legal troubles, Scour was forced into Chapter 11
Bankruptcy and suspended the use of its file-sharing service. Id. Most recently,
Scour's assets were purchased by CenterSpan Communications, which has vowed
to reopen the service as a "legal digital distribution channel for music, movies, e-
books, images, and documents." Welcome to Scour, at http://www.scour.com (last
visited Mar. 23, 2001).
20 Kuptz, supra note 114, at 236 (describing in detail how Gnutella works
without the use of central servers).
28 John Gibeaut, Facing the Music, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 36, 41; see Kuptz,
supra note 114, at 236-37.282 Gibeaut, supra note 281, at 41.283Id.
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the only recourse would be countless lawsuits against individual users of
these file-sharing softwares, practical enforcement of copyright claims
against either of these systems would be impossible. As one commentator
indicated, "[a]ny chance of shutting down unauthorized file-sharing ended
on March 14 [2000], when programmers at AOL's Nullsoft division
unleashed their server-less P2P client, Gnutella." 4 Gnutella and Freenet,
however, are not as easy to use as Napster, thus, they have "so far failed to
live up to their promise."2" Other commentators have noted that while
alternate peer-to-peer systems do work, they are currently far too complex
for the casual user and thus have a long way to go before they can fill
Napster's shoes, should it flounder under economic or legal pressure. 286 But
again, the peer-to-peer idea itself is the key. Given Napster's relative ease
of use, imitators have reverse-engineered the Napster interface to set up
competing free services28 that may succeed where the more difficult
alternatives may drive users away.
For many people, Napster has become a symbol of the techno-political
clash that the Internet has effected. As another commentator, John Barlow,
has pointed out, the Napster controversy has
transformed an evolving economy into a cause, and turned millions of
politically apathetic youngsters into electronic Hezbollah. Neither the best
efforts of Judge Patel-nor those of the Porsche-driving executives of the
Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, nor the sleek legal defenders
of existing copyright law-will alter this simple fact: No law can be
successfully imposed on a huge population that does not morally support
it and possesses easy means for its invisible evasion.2 8
What Barlow is describing is a form of civil disobedience that has a
distinct advantage over that practiced in Alabama in the 1960s: it is almost
I Kuptz, supra note 114, at 236.
285 Knocking OffNapster, WIRED, Jan. 2001, at 89, 89.
216 Hiawatha Bray, P2P Piracy? Don't Get Too Worked Up Yet, DIGITALMASS
AT BosTON.coM (Dec. 18, 2000), at http://digitalmass.boston.com/columns/
software/1218.html.
2"7 Knocking Off Napster, supra note 285, at 89. The copycats include
MyNapster (http://www.mynapster.com), Napigator (http://www.napigator.com),
and OpenNap (http://opennap.sourceforge.net). Id. These services often incorporate
more features than Napster, including the ability to search multiple networks and
download files other than MP3s. Id. For a more complete list of all things peer-to-
peer on the Internet, see Wired's Guide to Global File-Sharing, WIRED, Oct. 2000,
at 243.
288 Barlow, supra note 272, at 240.
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
entirely without consequence. Perhaps in this case, the technology has
completely outstripped the resources of the law to the point where "the ease
of stealing music and movies in cyberspace makes the traditional protec-
tions of copyright law worthless." 9 Even Judge Patel recognized the
possibility that other services and software might simply absorb the demand
for "free" music in the absence of Napster.2 If this is the case, then as
more and more of the populace comes online and becomes Interet-savvy,
perhaps the traditional conception of copyright becomes worthless, or at
least unenforceable. As a result, the debate over whether Napster use (or
any peer-to-peer file sharing) is legal or moral becomes irrelevant, since the
questions assume (erroneously) that enforcement is viable.
As it stands, however, Napster's legal prospects look bleak. While the
Ninth Circuit remanded the injunction order to the district court, it noted
that "a preliminary injunction against Napster's participation in copyright
infringement is not only warranted but required." 1 Its only concession to
Napster was a requirement that the injunction be narrowed in order to
remove "the entire burden of ensuring that no 'copying, downloading,
uploading, transmitting, or distributing' of plaintiffs' works occur on the
system."'2 As such, the district court must simply remold its injunctive
order to reflect the recording industry's burden "to provide notice to
Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works available on
the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable access to the
offending content' 293 and to reflect Napster's "burden of policing the
system within the limits of the system.""29 At the time of the final drafting
of this Note, news was released that plaintiffs in the Napster case had
"ask[ed] a San Francisco federal judge [Judge Patel] to order Napster to
'patrol' the site, removing song titles that record companies identify as
being copyrighted."295 Napster fears that the order will close them down.2
While Napster certainly is not giving up in its court battles, a recent
look at the Napster website indicates that the company may be looking in
89 Gibeaut, supra note 281, at 38.2 o A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 926 n.30 (N.D.
Cal. 2000), affid inpart and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).291 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Music Industry Proposes Final OrderAgainst Napster, THE NANDO TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2001), at http://www.nandotimes.com/technology/story/0,1643,50031
1243-500500595-503529059-0,00.html.
296 Id.
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another legal direction-towards congressional and other political (as
opposed to judicial) action.297 Like MP3.com's "Million E-mail March,"298
Napster is attempting to start a grassroots, democratically-oriented political
movement. They have posted a notice calling for people to contact
Congress and to sign up for the "Napster Action Network."299 Already,
Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has
promised to hold hearings to look at the Ninth Circuit's decision upholding
the Napster injunction.3 Senator Hatch commented in a speech before the
Senate: "I guess my feeling about this Ninth Circuit decision is a gnawing
concern that this legal victory for the record labels may prove pyrrhic and
short-sighted from a policy perspective."30 1
Fortunately, there is another alternative-one that the convergence of
judicial and legislative pressure might effect, and one that is perhaps best
for all the parties involved. New research indicates that many of the
presumptions and "facts" that lead Judge Patel and the recording industry
to see Napster users as little more than thieves were unfounded.0 2 While
this research may not meet the high demands of the evidence rules in a
court proceeding, it does indicate that the record companies may (and
should) be willing to move away from attempts at quashing Napster and
choose to partner with it instead. On October 31, 2000, Napster announced
a licensing partnership with Bertelsmann AG, the parent company of BMG
(one of the major plaintiffs in the litigation).0 3 Napster has offered to settle
the case before-proposing, for example, a plan where users pay a monthly
fee from which the record companies could then be paid 3 -- and there is
some indication that the other major defendants in Napster might also be
willing to enter into some sort of settlement. 05 Such a deal would
effectively diffuse the growing legal and social tensions surrounding the
297 Speak Out, NAPSTER, at http://www.napster.com/speakout (last visited Mar.
3, 2001).298 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
299 Speak Out, NAPSTER, supra note 297, http://www.napster.com/speakout.
300 Senate to Hold Hearings On Napster Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2001, at
C4.
301 Id.
31 See Joan Raymond, Profit in Sharing, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan. 2001, at38;
LisaM. Bowman, Study: NapsterBoosts CD Sales, ZDNET'NEWs (July 21, 2000),
at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2605961.html.
303 News Flash (Oct. 31,2000), athttp://www.napster.com/pressroom/00103 lb.
html.
304 See Larry Magid, Great Move, Napster, UPSIDETODAY (Nov. 1, 2000), at
http://www.upside.com/LarryMagid/39ff5ccl.html.
3
05 Id.
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status of Napster and MP3s. Following the lead of Bertelsmann AG, two
of the suit's largest independent record companies, TVT Records30 6 and
Edel Music,307 have also agreed to cooperate with Napster. An amiable
solution may be possible after all: "subscription-based services are
definitely on the horizon."30" Napster and partner Bertelsmann AG are
planning to release a subscription-based version of the Napster service
soon, and they are currently developing technology that will allow greater
protection against direct copyright infringement.3 A settlement with the
other record companies would allow a preservation and perpetuation of
Napster, perhaps even encouraging further development of the technology
while simultaneously allowing the record companies to retain some
measure of control over their copyrighted material.
This solution would allay, at least temporarily, the "great cultural war"
forecast by John Barlow."' Furthermore, such an option would more fully
achieve the "purposes" of copyright found in Sony, since a settlement
would allow for the preservation of a new technology while increasing
public access to artistic material. Perhaps more than anything, a voluntary
settlement between Napster and the recording industry would serve as a
shining example of "[1]awmaking [as] a complicated process that takes
place in a larger universe than the confines of legislatures and courts""
where "the common law of cyberspace [can] evolve as users express their
concerns and seek consensual solutions to common problems. 3'
2
CONCLUSION
As it stands, the effects of the "near-perfect anarchy" 313 have yet to
fully materialize, and the ultimate outcome in the legal arena has yet to take
306 Matt Richtel, RecordLabel Settles with Napster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,2001,
at C4.31 William Boston, EdelMusic Reaches Accord With Napster to Provide Songs
for Fee-Based Service, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2001, at B2.313 See Raymond, supra note 302, at 40.31 Dan Goodin, Stayin 'Alive-NapsterProposes aDeal, THE STANDARD (Feb.
20, 2001), at http://www.thestandard.com/ardele/display/O,1 151,22355,00.html.
310 Barlow, supra note 272, at 240.
31 Anne W. Branscomb, Common Law for the Electronic Frontier, in ELEC-
TRONIC CULTURE:TECHNoLOGYANDVIsUALREPRESENTATIoN 376,383 (Timothy
Druckery ed., 1996).312 d.
313 This phrase is borrowed from the creators of Freenet, who have used the
term to describe their own peer-to-peer system. Don Tapscott, FreenetMayMake
the Internet a Wilder Place, COMPuTERWORLD (May 22, 2001), at http://www.
computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47-74_ST045119,00.html; see also
supra note 278.
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shape.314 Congress and the Supreme Court have attempted to formulate an
approach to copyright law that gives practical effect to the most basic
constitutional goals of the copyright while reflecting the reality of
constantly changing and emerging technologies. The Court's decision in
Sony strikes the balance between the philosophical and the practical.
Unfortunately, when confronted with a technology as radical in impact as
the Internet, the courts have had difficulty in establishing a foothold from
which to consistently apply that balance.
The line of MP3 cases-Diamond Multimedia, MP3.com, and Napster
-has stretched the contemporary understanding of copyright law to its
limit. The traditional notions of copyright may in fact have reached the end
of their useful lifetime in light of the significant challenges that the Internet
has already posed in its short tenure. It has become readily apparent that
"[t]he whole structure of intellectual property, and the value of it, is
changing."315 Much depends on the ultimate outcome of the Napster case.
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to return an element of stability to
copyright law, but the technological changes of the past decade have
rendered this an unrealistic possibility. A lasting solution to the challenges
314 In fact, since the final drafting of the text of this Note, the case has pro-
gressed rapidly, and it appears that it will continue to do so. A few of the "future"
events discussed in the text have already taken place. For example, the
Congressional hearings regarding Napster have taken place. Richard Stenger,
Music Stars, Reps Clash in Congress Over Napster, CNN.COM (Apr. 3, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001frECH/internet/04/03/napster.hearing. Also, while Nap-
ster has implemented a filter to block copyrighted material in compliance with the
order that Judge Patel issued on March 5, 2001, Napster use is soaring.JudgeNixes
Napster, CNNFN-THE FiNANCIAL NETwORK (Mar. 6, 2001), at http://cnnfi.
cnn.con/2001/03/06/technology/napster, Study: Napster Use SurgesDespite File-
Blocking, CNN.COM (Apr. 4,2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/intemet/
04/04/napster.reut. Judge Patel has shown a great deal ofconcern thatNapsterdoes
not appear to be following her order. David Kravets, Judge: Napster May Have to
Be ShutDown, FoxNEws.coM (Apr. 10,2001), athttp://www.foxnews.constory/
0,2933,5355,00.html. Rather than immediately shutting Napster down, however,
Judge Patel has named a mediator in the case. Judge Names Mediator in Napster
Case, CNN.COM (Apr. 10, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/04/10/
napster.court.ap.
The events in this case are proceeding at an extremely rapid pace. By the time
this Note is published, the status ofNapster could be very different from the picture
presented here. The interested reader is urged to follow this constantly breaking
news and to take it into account when reading this Note.
315 Charles Nesson, Director, Harvard Law School Berkman Center for Internet
& Society, quoted in Gibeaut, supra note 281, at 38.
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to copyright law does not appear to lie within the grasp of the judiciary,
which faces rapid technological progress but is constrained by a set of laws
with limited elasticity. Only by turning to the fundamental underlying
principles of copyright jurisprudence can the judiciary hope to reach an
adequate solution.
Failing there, perhaps the solution will come from the legislature, or
perhaps the market will solve the problem through an out-of-court
settlement. Whatever the outcome, whereverthe decision, Napster's impact
on intellectual property practices and on society at large will be undeniable
and long felt.
